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The Applicability of Common Market
Antitrust Law to Acquisitions
and Mergers
Kurt H. Biedenkopf
INCE THE INCEPTION of the Common Market, it has been
thought that the institutions of the European Economic Com-
munity1 have no authority to prevent mergers of enterprises which
might result in market domination, or to require divestiture in the
event of market domination by
such a merger. In fact, it is fre-
THE AUTHOR: KURT H. BIEDENKOPF quently argued that present
(Received his Doctor of Laws degree E.E.C. enterprises must attain a
after studying at Munich and Frankfurt;
L.L.M., Georgetown University) is a high degree of concentration in
Professor of Civil Law, Commercial Law, order to compete effectively
Economic Law, and Labor Law at Ruhr
University, Bochum. He is also Chan- with the giant United States
cellor of the University of Bochum. and other international corpora-
tions attempting to gain a foot-
hold in the E.E.C. Yet, if the
foothold is obtained, not through open competition with E.E.C. enter-
prises, but by acquisition of such enterprises, the purpose of Euro-
pean concentration is defeated. This interplay of competitive forces
has caused E.E.C. personnel and others to look more closely at Ar-
ticles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome,2 to determine whether the
antitrust authority granted is broad enough to prevent concentra-
tions by acquisitions.
For purposes of this discussion, it may be helpful to consider
the following hypothetical: Assume that USCO manufactures and
sells product X in the United States and also manufactures and sells
same through its subsidiaries in the Common Market, but only to
the extent of about two percent of the total E.E.C. market. USCO
intends to acquire through its existing German subsidiary, which
does not manufacture product X, GERCO, a German company.
1 Hereinafter referred to as E.E.C.
2 The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community is often called the
Treaty of Rome because it was signed in Rome on March 25, 1957 by the six Common
Market Countries, Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg,
and Netherlands, who are often called "the inner six." March 25, 1957, No. 4300, 298
U.N.T.S. 14. E. STEIN & P. HAY, DOCUMENTS FOR LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE
ATLANTIC AREA 75 (1967).
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GERCO dominates the product X market in Germany and produces
less than 50 percent (but more than any other single competitor)
of product X sold in the Common Market. USCO and GERCO each
make product X under their own patents which are registered in
both the United States and the E.E.C. If the two companies were
merged, it still would be possible for other competitors to produce
a third style product X which would not infringe the patents of
either company.
The arrangement contemplated above by, USCO would involve
a concentration of enterprises by acquisition of an interest; conse-
quently, it falls within the definition of concentration developed by
the Commission of the E.E.C. in its study of the problem as it arises
within the Common Market.' The Commission's definition of con-
centration incorporates the distinction between combinations,
which includes cartels, and concentrations by mergers.4 In spite
of certain reservations concerning the possibility of arriving at
an exact distinction between the formation of a cartel and a concen-
tration of enterprises, a cartel is defined as an agreement regarding
certain conduct in the market between independent enterprises; a
concentration is assumed when several enterprises surrender their
economic independence and combine under a lasting uniform eco-
nomic leadership. When applying Articles 85 and 86 of the E.E.C.
Treaty5 the Commission has indicated that a merger by concentra-
3 The Problem of Concentrations of Enterprises in the Common Market. Study of
of the European Economic Community, REIHE WETEWERB No. 3, Brussels (1966).
(Hereinafter referred to as Study).
4 The distinction between connections and mergers by concentration has already been
accepted in the application of the rules of competition of the E.E.C. Treaty.
5 Articles 85:
1. The following practices shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
Common Market: all agreements between undertaking, [] all decisions by
associations of undertakings and all concerted practices which are liable to af-
fect trade between Member States and which are designed to prevent, restrict
or distort competition within the Common Market or which have this effect,
This shall, in particular, include:
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any
other trading conditions;
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical develop-
ment or investment;
(c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply;
(d) the application of unequal conditions to parties undertaking
equivalent engagements in commercial transactions, thereby placing them
at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) making the conclusion of a contract subject to the acceptance by
the other party to the contract of additional obligations, which by their
nature or according to commercial practice, have no connection with the
subject of such contract.
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tion occurs when there is a participation by companies in other com-
panies, which includes the acquisition of all or parts of the fixed,
assets of other enterprises, as well as the merger of two or more
legally independent companies to form a new company. The most
significant factors in a concentration by merger, in the opinion of
the Commission, are the "acquisition of title" or "a new arrange-
ment in respect of ownership in an enterprise."
The definition of concentration of enterprises is significant when
contrasted with the concept of a combination by cartel in that the
Commission treats as a merger a combination of enterprises resulting
from acquisition where only formal legal independence is main-
tained among the enterprises. In order for a combination to be
independent so as to fit within the definition of a cartel, the enter-
prises must remain economically as well as legally separate so that
they can continue to plan independently. Thus, economic independ-
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this article shall
automatically be null and void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable
in the case of:
- any agreement or type [ ] of agreement between undertakings, [*]
- any decision or type of decision by associations of undertakings, and
- any concerted practice or type of concerted practice
which helps to improve the production or distribution of goods or to promote
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the
resulting profit and which does not:
(a) subject the concerns in question to any restrictions which are not
indispensable to the achievement of the above objectives;
(b) enable such concerns to eliminate competition in respect of a sub-
stantial part of the goods concerned.
1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. paras. 2005, 2031, and 2051 (1968).
Article 86:
Any improper exploitation by one or more undertakings[*] of a dominant
position within the Common Market or within a substantial part of it shall
be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market and shall be pro-
hibited, in so far as trade between Member States could be affected by it.
The following practices, in particular, shall be deemed to amount to improper
exploitation:
(a) the direct or indirect imposition of any unfair purchase or selling
prices or of any other unfair trading conditions;
(b) the limitation of production, markets or technical development to
the prejudice of consumers;
(c) the application of unequal conditions to parties undertaking equiv-
alent engagements in commercial transactions, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of a contract subject to the acceptance by
the other party to the contract of additional obligations which by their
nature or according to commercial practice have no connection with the
subject of such contract.
1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. para. 2101 (1967). For another translation of Articles
85 and 86 see E. STERN & P. HAY, supra note 2, at 93-4. Study, supra note 3, at 21, 24.
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ence may be lost by an enterprise not only through merger, but also
through acquisition.6
A direct application of the rules of competition of the E.E.C.
Treaty to concentrations of enterprises7 such as the one suggested in
the aforementioned hypothetical has not yet been the subject of a
decision by the Court of Justice.8 Therefore, any answers to the
legal question posed by the hypothetical of whether this concentra-
tion is permissible must be reasoned from statements of the Com-
mission regarding its interpretation of the provisions of the treaty
and pertinent legal doctrines. This projection will be framed within
the following considerations:
(1) The application of Article 85 of the E.E.C. Treaty to con-
centrations;
(2) The application of Article 86 of the Treaty to concentra-
tions in general; and
(3) The concentration as an abuse within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 86 of the Treaty.
Article 85, para. 1 prohibits all agreements between enterprises,
decisions by associations of enterprises, and concerted practices
which are apt to impair trade between the member states and are in-
tended to restrain competition,9 and enumerates five situations
which are illegal.1" The language of the provision does not specif-
ically distinguish a restraint of trade caused by a cartel from a re-
straint caused by a concentration. However, it appears that the
prohibitions of the Article might apply in concentration situations
provided they are based on agreements between enterprises and
the competition is restricted. Nevertheless, both the Commis-
sion, in its Memorandum designated as "Rules of Guidance of the
Commission,"'" and most authors' 2 deny that Article 85 is appli-
cable to concentrations.
6 In the opinion of the Commission the distinction between merger and combina-
tion within a group of enterprises is not necessary with respect to a concentration of
enterprises. Study, supra note 3, at 21. An alternative view is propounded by Hefer-
mehl who does consider the distinction relevant for the purpose of applying Articles 85
and 86 of the E.E.C. Treaty. Hefermehl, Beurteilung von Fusionen und Konzern-
bildungen nach Artikel 85 und 86 des EWG - Vertrages, FESTScHRIFT FOR NIPPER-
DAY, 771 Bd. 11 (1965).
7 Concentration of enterprises will be referred to hereinafter simply as concentrations.
8 The Court of Justice was established pursuant to Article 4 of the E.E.C. Treaty.
Its powers and functions are defined in Articles 164 to 188 inclusive. Under Article
177, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction "to give preliminary ruling concerning: (a)
the interpretation of this treaty; . .."
9 Article 85, para. 1, supra note 5.
1Old.
11 Study, supra note 3, at 22.
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The Commission finds in this respect:
Summarizing it can be said that the generally applied distinction in
the legal treatment of cartels and concentrations is justified and
that for the reasons stated, Article 85 is not to be applied to agree-
ments whose subject is the acquisition of enterprises or parts of en-
terprises as well as the new arrangement of property in respect of
enterprises (merger, acquisition of participations, acquisition of
assets) 13
The Commission justifies its refusal to apply Article 85 to con-
centrations by reference to the character, construction, and criteria
of the provision. The Commission notes that all developed legal
orders as a general rule prohibit cartel agreements while permitting
concentrations. The explanation for the different legal treatment is
that cartels are intended to restrain competition, whereas concen-
trations cause this result only in special cases. 14  Mestmaecker' 5 ob-
serves that in an acquisition of an enterprise the entrepreneurial risk
is completely taken over; this differs from the effect of a cartel
where only certain aspects of the conduct of the enterprise are con-
trolled. Therefore, the goal of the concentration is to achieve the
most successful operation of the combined enterprises as an economic
unit. "Even if such a combination were primarily brought about
for purposes of restraining competition, the far-reaching (benefi-
cial) effects connected therewith would have to be considered."'"
The Commission finds authority for the conclusion that concen-
12 FIK CTHER, DB 689 (1966); Hefermehl, supra note 6, at 780, 783; Hefer-
mehl, Unternhmenszusammenschliisse im Lichte der Artikel 85 und 86 des Vertrages
fiber die Europaiische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG UND RECHT-
SVEREINHEITLICHUNG 329 (1967) (hereinafter cited Unternehmenszusammensch-
ifisse); Mestmaecker, Die Beurteilung von Unternehmenszusammenschlirssen nach Art-
tikel 86 des Vertrages fiber die Europaische Wirtschafsgemeinschaft, FESTSCHRIFT FOR
W. HALLSTEIN 321 (1966); M6hring, Enflechtungsmassnahmen der EWG-Kommis-
sion bei Unternehmenskonzentrationen nach deutschem Recht, in RECHTSVERGLEI-
CHUNG uND RECHTSVEREINHEITLICHUNG 345-46 (1967); Ommeslahge, Die Anwen-
dung der Artikel 85 und 86 des Rom-Vertrages auf Fusionen, BBITR.AGE ZUM
EWG-KARTELLRECHT 41, 66 (1967); STEINDORFF, REVUE DE MARCHE' COMMUR,
supp. a, No. 119, 186, 195 (1968); SCHLIEDER, id., at 218, 225; GLEIss-HIRSCH, EWG-
KARTELLRECHT, 2. Aufl. Anm. 24 zu Art. 85. See also, Study, supra note 3 at 21;
Fikentscher, Kooperation und Gem einschaftsunternehm en. EuRoPAIScH KARTELL-
RECHT 177 (1968) (hereinafter cited Fikentscher, Kooperation).
13 Study, supra note 3, at 21.
14 Study, supra note 3, at 24. Schlieder describes this finding as a result almost
unanimously agreed to as "a definite factor." Schlieder, supra note 12, at 225.
15 Mestmaecker, supra note 12, at 325. From the point of view of the rules of com-
petition, cartels and concentrations must be distinguished; the uniform application of
the same prohibiting provisions to both situations cannot lead to reasonable results.
Study, supra note 3, at 22.
16 Study, supra note 3 at 22.
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trations are exempt from the general prohibition of paragraph 1 of
Article 8517 by examining the criteria laid down in paragraph 3 of
Article 85. These criteria are considered inappropriate to the ap-
plied to concentrations. For example, the time limit applicable to an
exemption from the prohibition of Article 85, para. 1, which was
put into effect by Article 8 of Regulation 1718 is inappropriate for
17 See Article 85, supra note 5.
18 Council Regulation 17 provides:
Article 6. Decisions to issue a declaration under Article 85, paragraph 3.
(1) When the Commission decides to issue a declaration under Article
85, paragraph 3, it shall indicate the date. from which the decision shall take
effect. This date shall not be prior to the date of notification.1 (2) The second sentence of paragraph 1 shall not be applicable to the
agreements, decisions and concerted practices referred to in Article 4, para-
graph 2, and Article 5, paragraph 2, nor to those which are referred to in
Article 5, paragraph 1, and of which the Commission has been notified within
the time-limit fixed therein.
Article 7. Special provisions for existing agreements, decisions and practices.
(1) Where agreements, decisions and concerted practices already in ex-
istence at the date of the entry into force of the present Regulation and of
which the Commission has been notified within the time limitations provided
by Article 5, paragraph 1, do not meet the requirements of Article 85, para-
graph 3, of the Treaty, and where the enterprises and associations of enterprises
concerned put an end to them or modified them so that they no longer fall
under the prohibition laid down in Article 85, paragraph 3, the prohibition
laid down in Article 85, paragraph 1, shall be applicable only for a period
fixed by the Commission. A decision by the Commission pursuant to the
foregoing sentence cannot be invoked against enterprises or associations of en-
terprises which have not given their express assent to the notification.
(2) Paragraph 1 shall be applicable to agreements, decisions and con-
certed practices which are already in existence at the date of the entry into force
of the present Regulation and which fall within the categories referred to in
Article 4, paragraph 2, provided that notification shall have taken place be-
fore January 1, 1967.
Article 8. Period of validity and revoking of decisions to issue a declaration
under Article 85, paragraph 3.
(1) A decision to issue a declaration under Article 85, paragraph 3, of
the Treaty shall be valid for a specified period and may have certain conditions
and stipulations attached.
(2) The decision may be renewed on request provided that the condi-
tions laid down in Article 85, paragraph 3, of the Treaty continue to be ful-
filled.
(3) The Commission may revoke or alter its decision or prohibit those
concerned from taking certain courses of action:
(a) where the de facto situation has changed with respect to a factor
essential in the granting of the decision;
(b) where those concerned infringe a stipulation attached to the de-
cision;
(c) where the decision is based on false information or has been ob-
tained fraudulently; or
(d) where those concerned abuse the exemption from the provisions
of Article 85, paragraph 1, of the Treaty granted to them by the decision.
In the cases covered by sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d), decision can
also be revoked with retroactive effect.
Article 9. Competence.
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concentrations as they "are based on a definite change of property
in respect of the enterprise which for reasons of legal safety can only
in the individual case either be prohibited or be permitted for
good."' 9  Also, the reasonable participation of the consumers in
the profits resulting from the concentration required by Article 85,
para. 3, can not accurately be determined.2"
Contrary to the opinion held by the Commission and most
writers, Fikentscher21 has recently favored an application of Article
85 to concentrations. He wants to avoid the problems inherent in
a direct application of paragraphs 2 and 3 by considering Article
85, para. 1, as "an authorization of the Commission to interfere. 'u2
Fikentscher's unique contention is based on his distinguishing
between two types of restraints of trade: 1) restraint by measures,
which occurs when enterprises by their conduct intend to restrict
competition, and 2) restraints resulting from market position,
where restraint of trade is only a result or by-product. Restraints of
trade by market position are generally caused by concentrations.
The sanctions provided in Article 85, para. 2, may be inapplicable
if the parties did not intend to restrain competition by their merger.
However, upon examination of the general system of the rules of
competition of the E.E.C. Treaty, and a comparison of Article 85,
para. 1, with Article 65, para. 1, of the E.C.S.C. Treaty,23 Fikent-
(1) Subject to review of its decision by the Court of Justice, the Com-
mission shall have sole competence to declare Article 85, paragraph 1, inap-
plicable pursuant to Article 85, paragraph 3, of the Treaty.
(2) The Commission shall have competence to apply Article 85, para-
graph 1, and Article 86 of the Treaty, even if the time-limits for notification
laid down in Article 5, paragraph 1, and Article 7, paragraph 2, have not ex-
pired.
(3) As long as the Commission has not initiated any procedure pursuant
to Articles 2, 3 or 6, the authorities of the Member States shall remain com-
petent to apply Article 85, paragraph 1, and Article 86 in accordance with
Article 88 or the Treaty, even if the time-limits for notification laid down in
Article 5, paragraph 1, and Article 7, paragraph 2, have not expired.
1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. paras. 2451, 2461, 2471, and 2481 (1968). See also, E.
STEIN & P. HAY, supra note 2, at 147-48.
19 Study, supra note 3, at 23.
20 Mestmaecker, supra note 12.
21 Fikentscher, Kooperation, supra note 12.
22 Id., at 177.
23 European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (ECSC) Article 65, paragraph 1
states:
1. All agreements among enterprises, all decisions of associations of en-
terprises, and all concerted practices, tending, directly or indirectly, to prevent,
restrict or distort the normal operation of competition vithin the common
market are hereby forbidden, and in particular those tending:
(a) to fix or determine prices;
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scher concludes that the prohibitions of Article 85, para. 1, are ap-
plicable to restraints of trade by market position resulting from con-
centrations. While the language of Article 65, para. 1, of the
E.C.S.C. Treaty prohibits only restraints of trade by measures, where
the enterprises intend a reduction in competition, Article 85 of the
E.E.C. Treaty also covers conduct which only results in a restraint
of trade by market position. Fikentscher reasons that this expanded
test was necessary in order for Article 85 to reach restraints of
trade by market position. Therefore, Article 66 of the E.C.S.C.
Treaty, as compared with Article 85, necessarily has a more limited
application with respect to concentrations. 4
According to Fikentscher, Article 85's relationship to restraints
of trade by market position is a "law directed against abuse with the
possibility of eliminating the same." It has even been suggested
that under Article 85, mergers and concentrations whose component
enterprises have surrendered their economic independence could be
ordered to divest their interests, the sanction of divestiture being de-
rived from the prohibition of Article 85.25 However, Fikentscher
does not believe that under the treaty's present structure the Com-
mission could apply Article 85 to concentrations with the aim of
bringing about a divestiture. He opines: "In view of the require-
ments of legal safety and clarity, the authority of the Commission to
interfere could not be based on Article 85, para. 1."26 Rather, such
authority to interfere, particularly with respect to divestiture, must
come from an ordinance of the Council of the European Economic
Community. He suggests that the Council pass a regulation under
Article 87 placing this situation within the scope of Article 85, para.
1 27
(b) to restrict or control production, technical development or invest-
ments;
(c) to allocate markets, products, customers or sources of supply.
Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140 (1957); E. STEIN & P. HAY, supra note 2, at 53.
2 Article 66, paragraph 1, ECSC Treaty provides:
1. Except as provided in paragraph 3 below, any transaction which would
have in itself the direct or indirect effect of bringing about a concentration,...
shall be submitted to a prior authorization of the High Authority. This obli-
gation shall be effective whether the transaction in question is carred out by a
person or an enterprise, or a group of persons or enterprises, whether it con-
cerns a single product or different products, whether it is effected by merger,
acquisition of shares or assets, loan, contract, or any other means of con-
trol... "
E. STEIN & P. HAY, supra note 2, at 54.
25 STEINDORFF, supra note 12, at 192.
26 Id., at 194-95.
27 Article 87 of the E.E.C. Treaty states:
[Vol. 2: 75
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Notwithstanding this reservation, it is the opinion of this author
that the control against abuses with the possibility of bringing
about a divestiture, which Fikentscher bases on Article 85, para. 1,
goes beyond the limits of a permissible legal interpretation. Irre-
spective of the objections based on the legislative history which will
be discussed later, 2  nothing in the construction and the legal tech-
nique of Article 85 supports the proposition that Article 85, para.
1, may serve as the basis for a control against concentration.
Fikentscher justifies his interpretation on the basis of the back-
ground of his distinction between restraints of trade by measures
and restraints by market position. This distinction may be helpful
for some analysis, but it is of little use in interpreting Article 85. A
concentration can also be a measure which may result in restraints
of trade, and often does, not only by excluding competition be-
tween the enterprises involved, but also by changing the structure of
the market concerned, and thereby affecting competitive conditions.
As a rule, the enterprises involved are usually cognizant of these
changes. They do not occur suddenly as with a market position,
but rather are "caused" by the intended effect of the concentration
on the market. For this reason, a concentration "conditioned by
domination," the purpose of which is to dominate the market, would
have to be considered according to the Fikentscher view an intended
restraint of trade by measures and therefore would fall under the
1. Within three years of this Treaty coming into force, the Council shall
issue the necessary regulations or directions to put into effect the principles
set out in Articles 85 and 86. The Council shall decide on these unanimously,
on a proposal of the Commission and after consulting the Assembly.
If such regulations or directives have not been adopted within the speci-
fied period they shall be settled by the Council by qualified majority vote on
a proposal of the Commission and after consulting the Assembly.
2. The regulations or directives referred to in paragraph 1 shall be de-
signed, in particular:
(a) to ensure, by the institution of fines or penalties, the observance
of the prohibitions referred to in Article 85 (1) and in Article 86;
(b) to decide exactly how Article 85 (3) is to be applied, taking into
account the need both on the one hand to ensure effective supervision
and, on the other hand, as far as possible to simplify administrative con-
trol;
(c) to define, where necessary, the extent to which the provisions of
Articles 85 and 86 are to be applied in the various economic sectors;
(d) to define the respective functions of the Commission and of the
Court of Justice in giving effect to the provisions referred to in this para-
graph;
(e) to determine how domestic legislation is to be reconciled with the
provisions of this Article and with any rules made thereunder. [*]
1CCH COMM. MKT. REP. para. 2201 (1967). See also, E. STEIN & P. HAY, supra note
2, at 94.
2 8 See infra.
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standard of Article 86.29 Even Fikentscher would agree that Article
85 does not govern concentrations in which there is an intended re-
straint of trade by measures. Consequently, the application of Ar-
ticle 85 to concentrations must necessarily turn on whether it is, in
a given case, considered to be an overt restraint of trade by measures
of restraint resulting from market position.
The criteria for this distinction between restraints of trade can-
,not be found in Articles 85 or 86. According to Fikentscher, such
distinction would have to be established by an ordinance promul-
gated under Article 87. The weakness of this interpretation is that
such an ordinance would go beyond the authorization contained in
Article 87 in that it would not be restricted to the realization of
the principles laid down in Article 85. It would establish addi-
Stional principles. For this reason, Fikentscher's view appears to be
incompatible with the rules of competition of the Treaty.
There are additional objections to Fikentscher's theory. Un-
der his theory, the application of Article 85 to concentrations, in
the form of a law against abuse, with the possibility of divestiture,
presupposes that it is possible to find criteria in the provisions of
the treaty by which to distinguish permissible from nonpermissible
concentrations. As one author ° correctly observed, the valuation
standards contained in Article 85, para. 3 are exclusively geared to
agreements which encompass only a part of the economic planning
of the enterprises involved.3 ' This is particularly true of the prin-
ciple contained in Article 85, para. 3(a) which states that the
agreement may only impose such restrictions on the enterprises
involved as are indispensible to achieve the purposes recognized
under that paragraph.32 This provision is based on a partial re-
striction of the entrepreneurial freedom of planning, and on the
assumption that this partial restriction is to be measured against
the advantages of the agreement. By definition, such measuring
against these standards is impossible in the case of a concentration
because concentration necessarily involves the economic planning
of the enterprise as a whole. Therefore, the balancing of the in-
terests involved, which is necessary under Article 85, cannot use
the extent of the restriction as a guideline. Also, as was mentioned
earlier in regard to concentration, it is impossible to make a reason-
29 Fikentscher, Kooperation, supra note 12, at 193.
30 Mestmaecker, supra note 12, at 328.
31 See Article 85, paragraph 3, supra note 5.
32 Fikentscher, Kooperation, supra note 12, at 188, 198.
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able forecast about consumer participation in the resulting profit.
Concentration will, as a rule, not result in profits that can be passed
on. This is especially true in the cases requiring concentration
as a condition for technological progress as stated in Article 85,
para. 3.
The application of Article 85 to concentrations in the manner
proposed by Fikentscher would require the development of criteria
which would permit weighing the consequences on competition of
a concentration against the advantages of such a concentration from
the viewpoint of controlling abuses. Without legislation, this is
not possible on the basis of Article 85, even if the general principle
of Article 3(f) is also considered.8" Fikentscher admits that such
legislation must be effected by an ordinance under Article 87. How-
ever, such an ordinance would violate the limits imposed on the
Council by the authorization of Article 87.
In contrast to Article 85, both the Commission and some legal
writers assume that Article 86 is the applicable Treaty provision
governing concentrations.84 The Commission correctly finds that
in the application of Article 86, contrasted to Article 85, the means
by which the business combination is brought about are not rele-
vant. Nor do the criteria and the legal technique of Article 86 pre-
sent any obstacles in applying the provision to concentrations.
"The distinction between old and new cartels," the Commission
writes, "as well as the problems which result from the time limits
and the revocability of the exemptions granted, cease to exist" 5
with respect to Article 86. Furthermore - and this is essential -
when applying this provision, the permissibility of a concentration
will not be determined by positive but by negative criteria of
abuse.8"
The application of Article 86 to concentrations does not, there-
fore, meet with the same basic objections as the application of Art-
icle 85. However, the scope of the application of Article 86 to con-
centrations is disputed. There is no question that Article 86 can be
applied to concentrations when a market-dominating enterprise
brings about a merger or a combination of enterprises by abusing its
813 Article 3 provides that "the activities of the Community shall include ... (f)
the establishment of a system ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not
distorted . 1. " I CCH COMM. MKT. REP. para. 171 (1965). See also, E. STEIN &
P. HAY, supra note 2, at 76.
34 Study, supra note 3, at 24; Hefermehl, supra note 6, at 789.
35 Study, supra note 3, at 24.
8o Id.
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market power.3 7  But when analyzed precisely, this is not a case of
applying Article 86 to concentrations, but only to the realization of
,the prohibited facts, i.e. "An abuse of a dominating position.""8 If a
concentration is brought about by an abuse of a dominant position, 9
the act of concentration itself, the merger agreement or the agree-
ment which is the basis of the combination, may also be encom-
passed by the prohibition of Article 86 and therefore be considered
void.40
Legally, the above situations fall within the scope of the general
prohibition against abuse. Applying Article 86 to such facts does
not, therefore, answer the question whether Article 86 is applicable
to concentrations as such. The issue remains whether a concentra-
tion per se can be considered as "the abusive exploitation of a domi-
nating position in the Common Market or an essential part thereof
by one or several enterprises." It can be hypothesized that the Com-
mission would decide the issue affirmatively, concluding that al-
though Article 86 permits "the existence and creation of dominating
position," such conduct might be abusive under the definition of
the word in Article 86 when in view of the aims laid down by the
Treaty it constitutes a misconduct. The act of concentration would
constitute an abuse only when it would completely eliminate compe-
tition.41 In other words, the abuse is the change of the market struc-
ture brought about by the concentration, and without that change,
some other abusive acts would be necessary. Therefore, only in these
above situations would Article 86 be applied directly to concentra-
tions.
Mestmaecker shares the opinion of the Commission ' and assumes
that the effects of a concentration may be incompatible with the
aims of a policy of undistorted competition. He suggests that as
the concentration changes the market structure, each market should
ST Fikentscher, Kooperation, supra note 12, at 193.
38 M6hring correctly states that, in these cases, the abuse of the dominant position
of the enterprise is usually first manifested when the ruinous competition to eliminate
a competitor is started. Mhring, supra note 12, at 348-49. The prohibition of Article
86 is in these cases, therefore, not directed against the concentration but against the abuse
of the dominating position which is practiced at the occasion or with the aim of bring-
ing about the concentration.
39 This situation seldom happens and is difficult to prove. See generally, 1 CCFI
CoMM. MKT. REP. para. 2101 and 2111 (1967).
40 Hefermehl, supra note 6, at 794. This will at least be the case when the elimina-
tion of the prohibited abuse can only be accomplished by eliminating the merger or the
formation of the combine. But such cases will always be border line.
41 Study, supra note 3, at 26.
42 Mestmaecker, supra note 12, at 331.
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be evaluated in view of a possible abuse. He also realizes that a
concentration may result in a restraint of trade since, as Article 86
presupposes, the acquiring enterprise already holds a dominating
position in the market.43 This raises the question whether and ac-
cording to what criteria such an accretion of market power by con-
centration can by itself be considered an abusive exploitation of a
dominating position. In answering this question, Mestmaecker as-
sumes that the abuse does not presuppose any act against bonos
mores, but rather conduct which is incompatible with the system of
undistorted competition. 44 Whether the exploitation of a dominat-
ing position is considered abusive will be dependent on a determina-
tion of whether the aims of the Treaty, as well as the Treaty provi-
sion or provisions created by the organs of the community serving
their realization, will be frustrated by the conduct or at least must
be considerably disturbed.4" The definition of the system of undis-
torted competition which is necessary for the application of Article
86 is found in Article 85, para. 3.41 According to this provision, an
agreement between enterprises may not be exempted from the pro-
hibition of paragraph 1 when exemption makes it possible for said
enterprises to eliminate competition with respect to an essential part
of the products concerned.47 Therefore, a concentration in which a
market dominating enterprise is involved and whose result is to elim-
inate competition for an essential part of the products concerned
constitutes an abusive exploitation of the dominating position in
the Common Market."' Whether the concentration results in a
market exclusion of such intensity "that it is incompatible with the
protection of open markets in a system of undistorted competition"
is a question to be decided in each individual case.49  A concentra-
tion in which a market dominating enterprise is involved and which
43 Because of the original position of dominance of a concentration, any further
restraint of competition is nothing but a confirmation or extension of the dominating
position vis-a-vis present or potential competition. Id., at 333.
44 Id., at 331. Likewise, the Commission considers the conduct of an enterprise adu-
sive within the meaning of Article 86 when, in view of the aims laid down in the treaty,
it constitutes a misconduct by objective standards. Study, supra note 3, at 26; see also
DERINGER, WErWERBSRECHT DER EWG; GLEISS-HIRSCH, supra note 12.
45 Deringer, supra note 44.
46 Mestmaecker, supra note 12, at 344.
47 Based on a decision of the Court of Justice on the question of the so-called small
revision of the E.C.S.C. Treaty, Mestmaecker discerns a general principle of the E.E.C.
Treaty which would also have to be considered in applying Article 86. Rechtssache
13/60, Sammlung de Rspr. des Gerichtshefs, Bd. 8 (1962), at 183.
48 Mestmaecker, supra note 12, at 345.
49 Study, supra note 3, at 26.
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restrains competition does not necessarily go beyond the limit of
Article 85, para. 3(b). On the other hand, every concentration
which for an essential part of the products concerned eliminates
competition, according to the view held by Mestmaecker, is abusive
within the meaning of Article 86.0
The Commission5' and Mestmaecker would apply Article 86 to
concentrations without requiring the presence of any further qualify-
ing abusive factors. This is in contrast to the view that under the
E.E.C. Treaty, contrary to the E.C.S.C. Treaty, the Contracting Par-
ties did not intend to introduce a control over concentrations through
the competitive rules. The fact that this contrast is not discussed
by the Commission, von der Groeben, or Mestmaecker is of consider-
able importance.
According to the German background materials concerning the
E.E.C. Treaty, it is clear that the competition rules of the Treaty
were not intended to preclude the formation of concentrations or to
establish authority for their divestiture. The Bonn government has
said that a monopoly position in the market which is harmful to
competition cannot only be created by cartel agreements between
several enterprises remaining independent, but can also arise when
one or several enterprises reach a point at which they share a market
and are no longer exposed to essential competition. Such a market
dominating position can result both from a natural development of
one or several enterprises or from a concentration of several enter-
prises. Contrary to the E.C.S.C. Treaty, the E.E.C. Treaty does not
subject concentrations of enterprises to prior approval. It simply
prohibits abusive exploitation of a market dominating position.5"
In addition to the Bonn government's expression regarding com-
petition, the German Federal Parliament was concerned with
drafting a law against restraints of competition. The government's
proposal contained provisions which subjected the concentrations of
enterprises to a preventive control. Premised on Article 66 of the
E.C.S.C. Treaty, it provided, inter alia, for the possibility of dissolv-
ing concentrations which were likely to achieve market domina-
tion.5" This proposal has not been enacted in the Law against Re-
straints of Trade. The reporter of the Committee on Economic
50 Mestmaecker, supra note 12, at 347.
51 Von der Groeben, Die Wettbewerbspolitik als Teil der Wirtschaftspolitik in
Gemeinsamen Markt in Europa, PLAN UND WIRKLICHKETT 209, 210 (1967).
52 Anlage C zur BT-DRuCKsAcHIE 3440, 2 Wahlperiode.
53 Reg. Entwurf eines Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, BT-DRUCK-
SACHE 1158, 2 Wahlperiode.
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Policy justified the deletion of the draft provision on the grounds
that the concentration as such is not forbidden by the law, but only
the abuse of economic power which "in a given case may result from
such concentrations. -54 Consequently, the legislature only provided
for controls of abuse under § 22 of the Law Against Restraints of
Trade and introduced in § 23 a reporting requirement for concen-
trations when the concentration reaches a certain market share.
However, even in a case where competition is eliminated, there is
neither a provision prohibiting concentrations, nor is there one re-
quiring divestiture.
The Law against Restraints of Trade and the E.E.C. Treaty were
considered and adopted by the German Federal Parliament almost
simultaneously. In view of the unambiguous statements of the Fed-
eral Government and committees on the question of control of mer-
gers and divestitures, it is clear that the Federal Republic did not
want to subject concentrations to legal control under the E.E.C.
Treaty.
Herfermehl reports similar positions taken by the Dutch and
the Italian governments.55 The Dutch government has emphasized
that the Treaty, contrary to Article 66 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty, does
not provide for any prior approval of concentrations, and that only
the actual abuse resulting from a concentration is prohibited.
A comparison of the E.E.C. Treaty with the E.C.S.C. Treaty il-
lustrates that the Contracting Parties wanted to omit any rules of
competition applying to concentrations as such. This is evidenced
from the fact that the approval of concentrations required by Article
66 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty, has not been included in the E.E.C.
Treaty." There is also no provision dealing with a reporting re-
quirement for concentrations in the E.E.C. Treaty.57  Because of
these differences, it cannot be assumed that the Contracting Parties
intended the abuse provision of Article 86 to correspond to the pro-
hibitions of Article 66 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty.
In view of the above analysis, the opinion of the Commission
and of Mestmaecker that Article 86 is applicable to concentrations
5 4 Biedenkopf & Steindorff, Bericht des Abg illerhaus LAW AGAINST RESTRAINTS
OF TRADE (GWB) 174 (1957).
55 Hefermehl, supra note 6, at 782.
56 However, the language of the abuse in Article 86 was drafted in close reliance on
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty.
57 The Comission has only recently stated its intention to introduce such a reporting
requirement by an ordinance under Article 87 E.E.C. Treaty; see Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung 1969 No. 66, at 13.
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as such appears dubious. Instead, the prevailing doctrine"8 considers
the unambiguous language in the legislative history as indicating
that the prohibitions of Article 86 would be applied only when
abuse of the dominating position is manifested in acts or circum-
stances which are present in addition to the concentration as such.59
Although the majority doctrine appears to be based solely on the
legislative history of the E.E.C. Treaty, one writer" has suggested
that the statements of intent by governments during ratification, de-
bates, and preparations for treaties are only steps on the way to
developing the definitive contents of the treaty. The Court of
Justice of the E.E.C. has also hesitated in the past to draw governing
conclusions from the legislative history of Articles 85 and 86. It
must therefore be assumed to put less emphasis on the developed
intent of the Contracting Parties. There are, however, additional
reasons for objecting to the view held by Mestmaecker and the Com-
mission.
Both the Commission and Mestmaecker base their view that sim-
ple exclusion of competition by the concentration is an abuse of
application of the principles of Article 85, para. 3(b). 61 It is, how-
ever, questionable whether this principle can be incorporated into
Article 86 without the legislative guidance contained in Article 66
of the E.C.S.C. Treaty.
In Article 85 the criterion is geared to cartel agreements in that
it was developed for the approval or non approval of cartels. It
contains a balance of interests with respect to cartels and similar re-
straints of trade. Transferring the same principle to concentrations
would suppose that in light of competitive policy of the E.E.C.
Treaty concentrations be evaluated the same as cartels. Neither
the Commission nor Mestmaecker make this assumption.6" Article
86, however, contains no criteria which would permit weighing the
aspects of a concentration against consequences on competition so
as to determine an abuse. The Commission would admit the need
58 Hefermehl, supra note 6, at 782; STEINDORFF, supra note 12, at 195.
59 Apart from concentrations which are the result of an intentional elimination of
competition, there are concentrations which are carried on with the intent to abuse the
position or to restrain competition. Fikentscher, Kooperation, supra note 12, at 195;
Hefermehl, supra note 6, at 791; STINDORFF, supra note 12, at 204-05. Steindorff
considers such concentrations as an abuse of a legal form of business, rather than as an
abuse of the exemption of concentrations from Articles 85 and 86. If such an abuse of
form exists, Article 86 is applicable to the concentration act. Except for these cases, the
rules of competition are inapplicable to concentrations.
60 SCHLIEDER, supra note 12, at 215-16.
61 Mestmaecker, supra note 12, at 342; von der Groeben, supra note 51, at 208.
62 Mestmaecker, supra note 12, at 325.
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to develop new standards for concentrations because the results of
their existence are valued more positively for the development of
the Common Market. It suggests to recognize an abuse only when
the concentration results in a monopolization of a market. By do-
ing so, however, it abandons the principle contained in Article 85,
para. 3(b). Under this provision the possibility of eliminating
competition for an essential part of the products concerned prevents
granting an exemption for the agreement under the prohibition of
paragraph 1. Such a possibility exists, however, before an enter-
'prise reaches a monopoly position. The absence of substantial com-
petition is sufficient. This clearly shows that cartels receive a less
favorable evaluation under the competitive policy of the Treaty. By
deviating from the principle of Article 85, para. 3(b), the Commis-
sion shows that it does not wish to assume a similar evaluation for
concentrations, but permits concentrations even though they elimi-
nate competition for an essential part of the products, but not for
all. Only when competition for all products is eliminated would
there be a monopolization which the Commission deems necessary
for a prohibition of concentrations.
Since the Commission does not maintain the principle of Article
85, para. 3(b) for evaluating concentrations under Article 86, it
abandons its reasons for applying Article 86 to concentrations: the
assumption that Article 85 para. 3(b) establishes a principle which
is generally applicable for the system of the rules of competition.
The principle the Commission develops for Article 86 cannot be
derived from Article 85, because the limits of Article 85 established
for cartels are narrower. Since Article 3(f) of the E.E.C. Treaty,"
contrary to Article 4 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty,6 4 is not mandatory law,
the principle developed by the Commission for Article 86 is without
legal foundation in the Treaty itself.
63 Note 33, supra.
64 Article 4 of the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community
states:
The following are recognized to be incompatible with the common market
for coal and steel, and are, therefore, abolished and prohibited within the Com-
munity in the manner set forth in this Treaty:
(a) import and export duties, or taxes with an equivalent effect,
and quantitative restrictions on the movement of coal and steel;
(b) Measures or practices discriminating among producers, among
buyers or among consumers, especially as concerns prices, delivery terms
and transport rates, as well as measures or practices which hamper the
buyer in the free choice of his supplier;
(c) subsidies or state assistance or special charges imposed by the
state, in any form whatsoever;
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Moreover, one author 5 has correctly pointed out that if the ap-
plication of Article 86 is limited to mergers which lead to a monop-
olization of the relevant market, the provision will be of no practical
importance for cartels. The complete elimination of competition
can hardly ever be proven, and it is more difficult to prove its ab-
sence in relation to concentrations than with cartels. The Commis-
sion itself acknowledged this difficulty in the final observations of
its study; in considering the facts decisive for the monopoly situation,
it noted that the disappearance of smaller enterprises may not neces-
sarily lead to an absence of workable competition. 66
Therefore, any attempt to increase the effectiveness of applying
Article 86 to concentrations, by deeming the elimination of compe-
tition for an essential part of the products concerned as the essential
criterion, results in concentrations being treated under the same
principles as cartels. This would eliminate evaluating cartels and
concentrations differently under the rules of competition, and thus
would be contrary to the structure of these rules of the E.E.C. Treaty
and the opinion of the Commission. Thus, it is correct to state that
the anticompetitive effect of a concentration is not a criterion of
violation under Article 86. Also, Article 86 would not even be ap-
plicable in those cases where the concentration only results in the
elimination of a substantial part of competition on the relevant
market, without resulting in monopolization.6
In conclusion, Mestmaecker's suggestion for divestiture of con-
centrations abusing their market dominating position must be ex-
amined in light of Article 222 and Regulation 17. Under the law
in force at present, a divestiture procedure could only take place
under Regulation 17. That Regulation, however, contains no pro-
vision specifically authorizing a divestiture proceeding. Article 368
(d) restrictive practices tending towards the division or the exploi-
tation of the market.
E. STEIN & P. HAY, supra note 2, at 41.
65 STEINDORFF, supra note 12, at 203.
66 Study, supra note 3, at 27.
67 STEINDROFF, supra note 12, at 204.
68 Council Regulation 17/62, Article 3 which deals with infringements states:
(1.) If, acting on request or ex officio, the Commission finds that an en-
terprise or association of enterprises is infringing Article 85 or Article 86 of
the Treaty, it can by means of a decision oblige the enterprises or associations
of enterprises concerned to put an end to such infringement.
(2.) A request to this effect may be submitted by:
(a) Member States;
(b) Natural and legal persons and associations of persons, who show a
justified interest.
(3.) Without prejudice to the other provisions of the present Regulation,
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of the Regulation grants the Commission the possibility, by means of
a decision, to obligate enterprises violating Article 86 "to put an end
to such infringement." The text of the Regulation would not pre-
vent a decision ordering the sale of the shares of another enterprise
when the acquisition of these shares could be considered as a viola-
tion of Article 86. But the reasons which speak against the appli-
cation of Article 86 to such facts, are also opposed to the applica-
tion of Article 3 of the Regulation. Even if the Commission
should ignore this, it would still have to observe Article 222.69 Ac-
cording to that provision the Treaty leaves unaffected the legal
systems of the member states concerning property rights. As neither
the Treaty nor Regulation 17 contains provisions concerning the
question of divestiture, and German law also does not have such
provisions, the legality of a divestiture decision of the Commission
in our hypothetical case would have to be determined on the basis
of Article 14, para. 3, sentence 2 of the German Constitution. 70  Un-
der this provision an expropriation may only be effected by statute
or by virtue of a statute which provides for the kind and the extent of
the compensation. It is obvious that a decision to divest constitutes
an intervention which may be tantamount to an expropriation.
Such a decision would, in the absence of a statutory basis and in
the absence of a statutory provision concerning the details of the
compensation, be incompatible with Article 14, para. 3, sentence 2,
of the German Constitution. A decision of the Commission order-
ing the sale of the shares acquired would, therefore, run afoul of
Article 14 of the German Constitution and Article 222 of the E.E.C.
Treaty.
the Commission, before taking the decision mentioned in paragraph 1, may
address to the enterprises or associations of enterprises concerned recommen-
tions designed to put an end to the infringement.
1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. para, 2421 (1968); See also, E. STEIN & P. HAY, supra note
2, at 147.
69 Article 222 of the E.E.C. Treaty states: "This Treaty shall in no way prejudice
existing systems and incidents of ownership." 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. para. 5261
(1967); E. STEIN & P. HAY, supra note 2, at 115.
70 Article 14 guarantees the right of private property and the principle of inher-
itance. Paragraph 3, sentence 2 provides that expropriation is only possible "by law or
on the basis of a law, providing for kind and extent of compensation."
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